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Abstract
BLECICH, KIMBERLY L. Market Mechanisms and Price Volatility in New York
Electricity Markets. Department of Economics, June 2013.
ADVISOR: Professor J. Douglass Klein
The past two decades have born witness to a cascade of new legislation and
market design measures to restructure the United States’ electric power industry from
price-setting regulatory agencies to competitive markets. Deregulation was intended to
increase competition and improve market efficiency while preserving the reliability of the
transmission system. Results have varied in success, and deregulation has invariably led
to an increase in both the overall price level of electricity and volatility of those prices.
Investigating these deregulation consequences is crucial for market operations and
retrospective analyses of deployed mechanism outcomes.
The objective of this study is to extend the methodological research of Hadsell
(2007) in examination of the effect of three market deployments and one exogenous
factor on price volatility in the Capital Zone of the New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO) markets. To accomplish this end, a Generalized Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to model the conditional
variance, or volatility, of a constructed return series of Real-Time prices.
The GARCH models found an association between the three market deployments
and a reduction in price volatility. These variables included: Lake Erie Loop Flow
mitigation measures; establishment of a centralized wind forecasting system; and
economic dispatch of wind resources. Furthermore, this study confirmed the association
of Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) announcements and an increase in price volatility.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a cascade of new legislation and market
design measures to restructure the U.S. electric power industry. Until the onset of
deregulation, regulatory agencies governed the locally monopolistic, investor-owned
utilities (IOUs) and power pools that distributed power across individual states and
regions. Reform of this vertically tiered generation, transmission, and distribution system
has transformed this industry from one in which regulatory agencies set prices to one
where markets determine the price level. Deregulation was intended to increase
competition and improve market efficiency while preserving the reliability of the
transmission systems.
Unfortunately, the outcomes of these deregulation efforts have varied in their
success. Failure was exemplified in California’s attempted transformation in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Due to partial-deregulation of this state’s markets, further
exacerbated by drought-diminished hydropower production and limitations on the natural
gas supply, the structure plunged multiple IOUs as well as the entire State of California
into financial distress (Sweeney, 2006). By contrast, New York successfully moved from
its state-regulated New York Power Pool (NYPP) to the New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO), an “independent entity” authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to operate New York’s wholesale electricity markets (NYISO, 2011). These
two cases are ideal for a comparative study of the deregulation process and potential
outcomes.
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A shared negative characteristic of all deregulated markets is an associated
increase in price volatility following the implementation of the reforms. Due to the
nature of electricity production, higher price volatility is an inherent outcome in this
competitive market when compared to traditional commodity markets (Hadsell et al.,
2004; Benini et al., 2002). Furthermore, Johnston (2001) confirmed broad consensus that
deregulation has been accompanied by an increase in price level. The transition from
regulatory agencies to wholesale competitive markets has undoubtedly brought increases
in both the overall price level of electricity as well as the volatility of these prices.
Hadsell et al. (2004, 24) and Benini et al.l (2002, 1354) state the benefits of
understanding these characteristics of the electricity market are numerous, and include,
but are certainly not limited to, future spot price forecasting, proper risk management,
and understanding the overall impact of deregulation.
Electricity market operators conduct continuous refinements in an attempt to
reduce price volatility through various market design implementations. Hadsell (2007),
for example, finds a link between the implementation of a market mechanism called
virtual bidding and a reduction in price volatility in the NYISO markets. Published
literature has confirmed the value of analyzing price volatility, by itself and in relation to
measures taken to address its presence as well. These studies have been conducted on
markets around the world, ranging from England and Wales (Tashpulatov, 2011) to
Australia (Thomas and Mitchell, 2007). Many more have considered markets within the
United States, a number of which are discussed herein. However, very few have
explored price volatility in New York markets.
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Hadsell (2007) is the primary source for this analysis on price volatility in New
York electricity markets. Where he showed an associated link between virtual bidding
and a reduction in market price volatility, this study will extend his methodological
research to examine the individual effect of three additional NYISO market design
mechanisms and one exogenous factor on price volatility in the Capital Zone of the New
York markets. Specifically, this paper employs a Generalized Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to investigate the following:
implementation of the Lake Erie Loop Flow mitigation measures; establishment of a
centralized wind forecasting system; inclusion of wind resources in NYISO’s economic
dispatch; and announcement of Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) events.
Given the objectives and nature of the three implemented policies, it is expected
that they will be associated with a reduction in price volatility after their effective date.
In contrast, there is a predicted increase in price volatility associated with TSAs due to
increased costs related to the sequence of events that follows such an alert.
The following chapter provides an overview of the electricity market deregulation
transition, assorted outcomes, and further refinements introduced specifically within New
York markets. The third chapter presents the collected data and describes the analytical
approach and econometric tools used in this study. Presentation and analysis of the
empirical results follows in the fourth chapter. The study concludes in a final chapter
discussing policy implications, shortcomings of the current research, and suggestions for
further research.
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CHAPTER 2

Overview and Review of Existing Literature
This chapter explores the progression of electricity markets through the
deregulation process. In a chronological format, it begins by providing an account of the
transition from the regulated era to the current state of deregulated markets. This is
succeeded by a review of literature on the process outcomes, paying particular attention
to the consequential increase in price level and volatility within the markets and an
exploration of the dissimilar cases of California and New York. Conclusively, this
chapter addresses a number of market refinements NYISO has made after its
establishment as the wholesale electricity market operator.
2.1 Regulation Era
Prior to the onset of deregulation in the U.S. electric power industry, regulatory
agencies governed various locally monopolistic investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and
power pools that distributed power across individual states and regions. While
generation, transmission, and distribution generally took the form of vertically-structured,
regulated monopolies (NYISO, 2011, 1), various arrangements included, but were not
limited to, the configuration of Power Pools, reliance on voluntary multiple utility
cooperative management, or domination by a select few electric companies. Focusing on
two case studies set herein, California and New York present two different forms of
regulated transmission systems prior to the deregulation period and are an excellent
model of contrastive solutions to the distribution of power.
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2.1.1 Local Monopolies: California
During the regulated era, power across the State of California was provided by
three major investor-owned utilities (IOUs): Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E),
Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E). As is
evident of Figure 2.1, there existed additional smaller utilities and specific municipal
power suppliers like the Los Angeles Power and Electric Company; however, the three
primary IOUs supplied 78% of the state with power (Sweeney, 2006, 320). The utilities’
vertical integration often meant that generation, transmission, and local distribution were
controlled by these area-specific monopolies. While their financial decisions were
subject to regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), conducted
analyses determined that, rather than reflecting market conditions, market prices were
based primarily on cost of service (Sweeny, 2006, 320).
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Figure 2.1: California Distribution Zones by Utility: Regulation Era
1996
(Source: Sweeney, 2006)
2.1.2 Power Pool: New York
While a limited number of electric utilities also supplied New York power prior to
deregulation, their fate took a twist unlike that of California. Operating in a voluntary
cooperative effort, the following eight companies primarily controlled the New York
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electric distribution network: Consolidated Edison, Long Island Lighting Company, New
York State Electric & Gas Company, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Orange &
Rockland Company, Rochester Gas & Electric Company, Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Company, and the New York Power Authority (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 5). However,
after twenty-five million people were left without power for a maximum of twelve hours
during the Great Northeast Blackout on November 9, 1965, these companies deemed it
necessary to form a statewide wholesale institution (NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012;
Tierney and Kahn, 2007). The New York Power Pool (NYPP) was funded by stateregulated consumer rates to operate grid management and reliability functions including,
but not limited to, economic dispatch of generators and balancing real time supply and
demand (NYISO, 2011; Tierney and Kahn, 2007). However, utilities were able to
commit their units as they saw fit, rather than allowing NYPP to choose from all state
units as in a centralized unit commitment system characteristic of other power pools of
the northeast. This limited the pool of available plants and reduced the efficiency of the
choices made by NYPP in economic dispatch (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 5-6).
2.2 Deregulation Process
2.2.1 Why Deregulate?
Although electricity systems of the regulated era were not unsuccessful in
providing electric power to consumers, many experts of the time contended that these
were not as economically efficient as was possible, dominated as they were by regulated
monopolies (Sweeney, 2002, 2). Deregulation was thus an attempt to stimulate
competition among market participants; this was presumed to carry the additional result
of lowering the high system costs and corresponding retail rates (NYISO, 2011, 1;
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Sweeney, 2006, 326). A component of the high prices included concern that utilities
were not dispatching the next least-cost resource, but providing generation from plants as
desired without concern for minimizing costs (Sweeney, 2006, 326). Proponents of
deregulation stressed such projected economic benefits, which provided ample support
for progression into the deregulation process.
2.2.2 Influence of England and Wales
Power pools of the Northeast provided evidence that electricity distribution could
be managed efficiently through one organization. The establishment of the England and
Wales wholesale electricity market added further fuel to the movement for change in
electric power distribution management (O’Neill et al., 2006). This sprawling
transmission system was established in April 1990 and transcended boundaries between
the two countries, providing electricity to a wide expanse of territory (Green, 1998).
According to Green (1998):
The ideological beliefs underlying the restructuring were
that private ownership and the profit motive gave far better
incentives than the most benevolent kind of state
control…and that competitive private industries gave better
results than monopolies. (2)
The market’s use of auction pricing managed by a central grid company
demonstrated the ability of a chief management body to successfully handle a diverse
array of supply and demand requirements (Tashpulatov, 2011). The rules and
accomplishments of the England and Wales market in combination with the success of
power pools within the Northeast of the United States provided strong evidence in
support of centrally organized markets in the United States (O’Neill et al., 2006).
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2.2.3 Deregulation Legislation
Establishment of auction-based markets managed by a centralized body was
furthered through a series of acts and orders initiating the transformation of the varying
operational systems established in California and New York. Restructuring movements
began with the establishment of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
(PURPA). This required the purchase of power from smaller generating facilities, or
“qualifying facilities” (QFs), by utilities in an attempt to increase investment in
renewable and cogeneration power plants and boost competition (O’Neill et al., 2006,
481); the payment rates were based on the “avoided cost” of producing the power from
their own generating units (Sweeney, 2006, 324). Although O’Neill et al. (2006, 483)
states the 1980s and early 1990s were witness to a decline in PURPA-driven investment
due to “declining fossil fuel prices, reductions in renewable energy subsidies, qualifying
tests and other factors,” Figure 2.2 provides evidence that investment in QFs specifically
within California significantly increased after the establishment of this Act, so much so
that the total capacity of QFs brought online from 1978 to the beginning of January 2000
exceeded that of the combined output of invested conventional and nuclear generation.
Although PURPA could force utilities to purchase some power from QFs, these
companies still controlled transmission lines. To combat this competition issue and
motivated by the success of PURPA in generating investment in independent QFs, the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) was implemented across the country requiring
open-access for transmission lines to non-utilities (O’Neill et al., 2006, 483; Sweeney,
2006, 325). Further force would be given to this act four years later when the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 888.
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Figure 2.2: “Qualifying Facility” Generation: New Plant Construction
1978 – January 2000
(Source: Sweeney, 2006)
With pressure for more competition among utilities, it was only logical to begin
formulating the basic concepts of an established market with a centralized organizational
body. California issued its “Blue Book” on March 31, 1994, which drew on the rules of
the England and Wales market to lay down a proposal for a competitive wholesale market
(Joskow, 2006). The principles of a centralized market manager were expanded upon in
FERC Order 889 in 1996, and provided the basis for the creation of Independent System
Operators (ISOs) that would organize and administer the wholesale electricity markets.
ISOs were to be separate from political and federal agendas, although still subject to the
jurisprudence of FERC. Finally, divestiture of utilities and their generators was both
strongly encouraged by the New York State Public Service Commission’s Competitive
Opportunities Proceedings in 1997 (NYISO, 2011; NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012)
and highly incentivized by the CPUC in California in 1998. The latter required the
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divestiture of 50% of generation, and provided generous financial incentives for the
latter; by April of 1999, all utilities had separated from their generators (Sweeney, 2006,
329; 338).
2.2.4 Restructuring Architecture
Joskow (2006) and Littlechild (2006) provide an interesting theoretical approach
behind deregulation, outlined as “textbook architecture” for restructuring; when followed
appropriately, the steps promote competition and ensure the success of electricity
markets. Process privatization is one of the most important aspects enabling fair
competition without influence by political or participating parties. Removal of vertical
monopolies and creation of a horizontally competitive industry of utilities and generators
go far to both ensure that one market participant cannot dominate or manipulate market
prices as well as to enable easier supervision of all market players. Implementation of
regulations such as Order 888 ensuring transmission line access to non-utilities promotes
new generation participation and works to add competition on the power supply side.
These steps were completed prior to the issuances of Order 889 and later legislation,
which advance the subsequent components of restructuring. Contractual and real-time
energy and ancillary markets ensure economically efficient distribution of power and
should be administered by a central impartial ISO. To ensure competition in the retail
realm, inhibiting factors such as retail tariffs must be removed; to ease transition into a
competitive retail market, it will be necessary to help power suppliers until such
competition is ensured, exemplified by California’s attempts at stranded cost recovery.
Finally, for such a transition to succeed, independent regulatory agencies must be able to
ensure competition is promoted and additional efforts must be given to anticipate
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potential issues arising during this process of deregulation (Joskow, 2006, xvii;
Littlechild, 2006, 4-6).
2.3 Deregulation Outcomes
2.3.1 Unintended Consequences: Price Level and Volatility
Electricity markets produce characteristically higher levels of price volatility,
attributable to many reasons, which include the physical nature of electricity as nonstorable, inelastic demand for its supply, and unpredictable prices of inputs (Hadsell et
al., 2004, 23; Benini et al., 2002, 1354). These can cause significant difficulties in
maintaining overall stability of the grid due to the challenge of constantly matching
generation supply with demand for power (Borenstein, 2001, 2). In terms of volatility,
Hadsell et al. (2004, 23) reports that deregulated competitive wholesale markets “exhibit
levels of price volatility unparalleled in traditional commodity markets.” Deregulation
did not appear to alleviate this volatility nor decrease the overall price level; indeed,
common to all deregulated markets, were characteristic increases in both. Johnston
(2007, 1) testifies that those states that have undergone deregulation portray a
characteristically greater increase in prices than those who remained with government-set
price levels. This is indeed supported by findings of the U.S. Energy Department, who
reported a near-tripling price level difference charged to industrial companies
participating in regulated versus deregulated markets between 1999 and July 2006
(Johnston, 2007, 1).
Increases in price level and volatility were not characteristics confined to
deregulated markets in the United States. Tashpulatov (2011) examined the volatility of
prices in the England and Wales electricity market from 1990 through 2001. As
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discussed above, the rules of this market were highly influential in the reconstruction and
resulting structure of the United States markets. While Tashpulatov (2011) determined
the implementation of a price-cap was successful in reducing prices, it also increased
volatility. The subsequent utility divestiture of generation and distribution was associated
with a reversal of this trend; while volatility decreased, the overall price level increased.
A reduction in both measures was only apparent following a second and final round of
divestitures.
2.3.2 Importance of Market Analyses
Varying results for market alterations employed in the England and Wales
deregulation process provides reason for continuous reassessment of current market
conditions to ensure the original intention of a market change was in fact achieved. If
England and Wales had ceased its deregulation process at the initial price cap with its
consequential increase in price volatility or after the first round of divestitures with its
associated increase in overall price level, there may have been detrimental long-term
effects on the market. Evidence of increased price level and volatility in this market
combined with its strong influence on the deregulated market structures within the United
States lends significant support to the importance of reassessment measures in the United
States’ markets as well.
The findings of Tashpulatov (2011) support the arguments of Hadsell et al. (2004)
in his assertion that there are great benefits to studying and understanding price levels and
volatility in electricity markets. The transition from government-set prices to wholesale
competitive market has brought undeniable increases in both the overall price level of
electricity as well as the volatility of these prices. Hadsell et al. (2004, 24) reports that
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the benefits to understanding these deregulation results includes, but is certainly not
limited to, future spot price forecasting, electricity futures and energy derivatives pricing,
and understanding the overall impact of deregulation. Accurate predictions of future
prices, in particular, are extremely vital to market participants, whose risk of involvement
in the markets is highly correlated to volatility levels. Risk reduction consequentially
brings greater confidence to the utilities and generators with regards to their involvement
and investment in the wholesale market.
2.3.3 Structural Variations: California and New York
The intended outcome of deregulation was to increase market competition and
ensure that demand and supply of electricity met at the most economically efficient
manner. However, varying results have occurred, and this study continues with the
contrasting examples of California and New York. Both received approval from FERC
for the formation of an ISO, and in 1998 and 1999, the California and New York ISOs
(CAISO and NYISO) were respectively established. However, the markets managed by
each state’s ISO were quite different. California’s system was split between two separate
market operators: the Power Exchange (PX) managed the Day-Ahead (DA) spot markets
via zonal pricing, while CAISO handled the grid operation, including congestion
management, as well as ancillary services and the Real Time (RT) market (O’Neill et al.,
2006; Sweeney, 2006). In contrast, NYISO handled both DA and RT markets. These
were conducted with Locational Based Marginal Pricing (LBMP), or the price at each
network bus corresponding to the marginal cost of an additional increment of energy; in
essence, LBMPs reflected the next least-cost resource available based upon transmission
system constraints such as congestion (O’Neill et al., 2006; Sweeney, 2006). In addition,
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NYISO managed operating reserves and zonal Installed Capacity (ICAP). However,
these variations in structure were not the only factors resulting in the dramatically
different outcomes of deregulation within these two states.
2.3.4 Failed Outcome: California
The structure taken by the CAISO markets as described above lent itself to the
catastrophic deregulation failure that occurred in California. Extensive studies have
attributed the so-called California Electricity Crisis to this deregulation. However,
subsequent analyses suggest that it is not the fact that the California markets were
deregulated but rather that the markets were only partially deregulated which ultimately
led to extensive problems. Littlechild (2006, xix) states, “the main problem, in short, was
one of inappropriate regulation, and was not attributable to privatization or competitive
markets per se.” Sweeney (2006) contends that the California Electricity Crisis is
actually a combination of an electricity and financial crisis, and neither of these were a
direct result of deregulation.
The western electricity crisis was primarily the product of a
“perfect storm”, a combination of simultaneous adverse
conditions, of flawed market rules, and only secondarily of
exercise of market power and market gaming. The financial
crisis was the direct result of California regulatory actions.
However, the financial crisis was not the result of
deregulation, but rather of inappropriate regulation.
(Sweeney, 2006, 379-380)
The continued regulation of certain aspects of the California markets was
illustrative of acute government mismanagement (Sweeney, 2002, 10). Legislation was
originally issued with the intention of helping utilities recover stranded costs of
investment in high-cost generation prior to deregulation with the predicted wholesale
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price decrease; this was to be accomplished through a “competition transition charge”
(CTC) issued by utilities to their retail customers (Sweeney, 2006, 327; 330). However,
these were first limited in size, then finally converted to retail-level price caps, set at 10%
below their June 10, 1996 levels (Sweeney, 2006, 332-333), effectively ensuring price
increases at the wholesale level were nontransferable to end-use consumers.
Consequently, utilities were forced to absorb price shocks and retail prices did but reflect
fluctuations in the wholesale market. Sweeney (2002) argues that if this cap had not been
established, price increases in the wholesale market would have been much smaller.
Inappropriate governmental interference continued with the prohibition of the
formation of long-term contracts. This effectively prevented utilities from hedging
against potential price fluctuations and forced them to purchase primarily in spot markets,
where they were subject to uncertain but standard price volatility (Sweeney, 2006, 319;
333). The Manifesto on the California Electricity Crisis (2003) asserts that even with
price caps preventing the transfer of price spikes to retail consumers, if utilities had not
been purchasing 50% of their power on the sport markets, the financial crisis of the utility
companies would have been mitigated. Unfortunately this was not so, and when input
prices rose for generators, utilities were forced to buy at a higher price than that at which
they were capable of selling; indebtedness followed by bankruptcy were only to be
expected. This was the fate of two of the three largest utilities (Figure 2.1); PG&E filed
for bankruptcy in April 2001 and SCE flirted with a filing for reorganization until they
reached a rate agreement with the CPUC (Sweeney, 2006, 366).
Consequences of “gross mismanagement by the California governor and the
CPUC” were further exacerbated by adverse and unforeseen factors (Sweeney, 2006, 10).

16

	
  
These included summer heat waves in 2000 and an unusually cold winter of 2000-2001,
where increased demand resulted in significant price spikes, as well as a corresponding
widespread three-year drought that restricted critical hydroelectric generation (Manifesto
on the California Electricity Crisis, 2003; Said, 2001). Inadequate generation capacity
inevitably led to increased prices on or near peak load. Aggravation of the issue
continued with limited natural gas pipeline infrastructure and skyrocketing gas prices, the
input of which was required to power generators replacing the stunted hydropower
(Sweeney, 2006, 345).
Beyond these input issues, flawed structural market design enabled a number of
market participants to game the system as well. The most notorious of these market
manipulators was Enron Corporation, whose operations caused drastic increases in spotmarket electricity prices. Kranhold et al. (2002) reported on the release of memos
describing Enron’s actions in the market, which revolved around two main market
manipulations: (1) the creation of artificial congestion, of which CAISO would pay them
to relieve; and (2) the “laundering” of electricity, directly in response to the price caps,
whereby Enron would route electricity out of the state and then resell it back into the state
at a price unrestricted by the in-state price cap. The memos also named a number of
other companies who embarked in price-gouging through artificial energy shortages,
which included Reliant Energy, Inc., Dynegy, Inc., Mirant Corporation, and Williams
Corporation (Kranhold et al., 2002, 2).
These factors created what Sweeney (2006, 379) dubbed “the perfect storm,” all
of which fed into the drastic price spikes that were so characteristic of the California
Electricity Market Crisis and eventually forced Governor Gray Davis to declare the
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California State of Emergency on January 17, 2001 (Said, 2001, 5). Benini et al. (2002)
models both the price levels and volatility of this market from 1999 through the end of
2000 (Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Not only does this modeling cover directly before the crisis,
but also illustrates the electricity market’s meltdown as it occurs. This provides ample
ability to compare where “normal” prices were originally leveled to the drastically
elevated prices of the crisis as well as the impressive increase in price volatility from
1999 to 2000. In addition, Benini et al. (2002) draws attention to the relative lack of
volatility in prices during 1999 and the first half of 2000, prior to the meltdown. Even
with the occurrence of doubling gas prices in early 2000, this market exhibits an
impressive stability. It must therefore be inferred that the price volatility during the
second half of 2000 was caused by the lack of generating capacity during the high
demand and artificial energy shortages created by manipulating market participants.

Figure 2.3: Two-Weeks Average Prices in California Markets
1999 – 2000
(Source: Benini et al., 2002)
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Figure 2.4: Two-Weeks Price Volatility in California Markets
1999 – 2000
(Source: Benini et al., 2002)
2.3.5 Successful Outcome: New York
In contrast to the extensive degree to which California has been analyzed (the
authors discussed above are just a minute portion of the bulk of material available), much
less attention has been given to New York. Perhaps the “blame” can lie to some degree
with the success in which New York has transitioned through the deregulation period.
NYISO’s Independent Market Advisor stated, “the transition to competitive electric
markets have been remarkably smooth given the unprecedented scope of this effort”
(NYISO, 2011, 10). Littlechild (2006, 12) states that New York was, in fact, faced with a
number of exogenous shock factors, including demand and fuel prices, which contributed
to the utter ruin of the California markets, yet New York avoided the fate of California.
Evidence provided by O’Neill et al. (2006, 518) suggests that it is due to the prior
structure of the system as controlled by a power pool that allowed a smooth transition
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into a deregulated state to occur. The procedures and reliability functions already
existed; it was primarily a matter of transferring power and altering some market rules.
NYISO holds four core values regarding the management of the state’s
transmission system: “(1) meeting New York’s power needs reliably and safely by
managing its bulk electricity system; (2) running fair, open and competitive wholesale
electricity markets; (3) planning for New York’s future power needs; and (4) leading the
way in technology of tomorrow’s smart grid” (NYISO, 2011, ii). The success of NYISO
in achieving these goals is attributed to the “shared governance” of the organization,
which includes both an Independent Board of Directors and stakeholder committees. The
latter group allows all involved parties, from transmission owners to end-use consumers
to environmental groups, within NYISO’s system have an opportunity to voice their
opinion on the rules and direction of the corporation (NYISO, 2011, 1). In concrete
terms of success, NYISO (2011) provided the following information in their Initial
Decade Review, which reported NYISO’s accomplishments during the development of
competitive markets:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Market participant numbers tripled, from 120 in 2000 to 360 by
2008;
Dollar values of annual transactions doubled, from $5.2 billion in
2000 to $11 billion in 2008;
Investment increased in new facilities and upgrades of current
facilities;
Plant efficiency improved, such that the system-wide heat rate of
fossil-fueled generation improved by 21%;
Average plant availability increased to 94.7%, which corresponds
to an additional 2,000MW, or the amount generated by the
investment in 4 new medium-sized plants;
Wholesale electricity prices (adjusted for fuel costs) declined 18%;
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•

Environmental performance drastically improved, such that power
plant emission rates1 dropped by double digits between 1999 and
2008 (NYISO, 2011)

This organization has made undeniable strides in their progress after the
deregulation of the markets. In fact, their Independent Market Advisor reported,
“NYISO markets are at the forefront of market design, and have been a model for market
development in other areas” (NYISO, 2011, ii).
2.4 NYISO Market Refinements
Even with the projected success of the NYISO, the organization continues to
make modifications to its rules and market structure in promotion of the most
economically efficient and successful manner of running the state’s transmission system.
The New York Public Service Commission reports that performance metrics
incorporating NYISO’s continuous advancements “indicate that New York’s wholesale
markets are among the most advanced in the nation” (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 7). While
this paper cannot hope to encompass the copious range of actions the NYISO has made to
enhance its system, this section will give a brief overview of an assorted group of these
measures.
2.4.1 New Generation
New generation is intrinsically linked to a decrease in price levels and volatility,
particularly if developed in areas with limited generation capacity or afflicted by
constraints on the transmission system. From 2000 to 2006, Tierney and Kahn (2007, 7)
reported that 5,000 MW of new generation capacity (or about 15% of total capacity in
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

Power plant emission rates are measured in tons per year of the following components: sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide (NYISO, 2011, 4).
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2007) was brought online. As is evident of the new generation records in Figure 2.5,
these were particularly focused in Long Island and New York City, which are notoriously
under-supplied. In 2011, NYISO reported that an additional 2,600 MW had been added
to the transmission system in the succeeding three years, 80% of which had been
established in the two high-demand areas listed before, as well as the Hudson Valley
Zone (Figure 2.6). New generation combined with the enhancements to existing
generation as referenced previously, has extensively contributed to alleviating price
spikes that occur when nearing or reaching peak load.
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Figure 2.5: New Generation Records by NYISO Transmission Area
2000 – 2006
(Source: Tierney and Kahn, 2007)
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Figure 2.6: New York Zonal Load Map
(Source: NYISO Market & Operational Data)
2.4.2 Demand Response
Demand response (DR) programs are extremely effective instruments used to
lessen the effects of high electricity demand during peak-load hours. Albadi and ElSaadany (2007, 3) present numerous benefits to the installation of a demand response
program; of particular relevance to this paper is their assertion of the direct correlation to
the improvement of market performance through the reduction in price volatility.
NYISO has installed a number of market-based DR programs, which include: the DayAhead DR Program (DADRP), which allows companies to give bids of reduction, or
“negawatts” into the DA market as generators; the Emergency DR Program (EDRP) and
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ICAP Special Case Resource (SCR) Program, both of which reduce peak load during
energy shortages through shut-down notifications given to participants, who are primarily
commercial and industrial consumers; and Demand Side Ancillary Services Program,
which allow retail consumers the ability to bid load curtailment into the DA and RT
markets (NYISO, “NYISO Demand Response Programs,” 2012). In 2002, it was
estimated that 400MW were shaved from peak demand on consecutive record
consumption days at the trigger of EDRP (NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012). This
impressive reduction in demand would have aided in depressing price spikes and
volatility that inherently occurs as demand nears generation capacity limits.
2.4.3 Standard Market Design (SMD2)
On February 1, 2005, NYISO deployed its current Standard Market Design
(SMD2). At a cost of $32 million over two years, this project established RT and DA
markets on a common platform (NYISO, 2005). The shared platform was intended to
increase the convergence of RT and DA prices, reducing volatility, and provide better
historical data to “allow for more informed, precise and economical dispatching decisions
(NYISO, 2005, 1). The transition to this new system was facilitated by the co-operation
of the old and new processes for one week during this period, which allowed for a
smooth and successful changeover (NYISO Insider, 2005). While this deployment was
relatively recent, future analyses will be vital in understanding its overall impact.
However, this has been arguably the most significant alteration to the New York markets
since their deregulation, reflecting NYISO’s understanding and belief that this “era of
competitive markets…are more complicated than ever and require the most sophisticated
hardware and software available. SMD2 gives us that” (NYISO, 2005, 1).
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2.4.4 Virtual Bidding
The implementation of virtual bidding in November 2001 was of particular focus
to Hadsell (2007). This market function operates financially settled bids rather than
physically contracted agreements, providing both entry into the electricity market field by
an increasingly large array of participants as well as a means of hedging against volatility
in the markets by physical bidders (Hadsell, 2007, 66). Hadsell (2007) states its
designation was to decrease the discrepancy between DA and RT prices as well as
general price volatility within the markets; his findings presented statistical proof that the
installation of this program was, in fact, associated with a reduction in price volatility.
2.5 Summary
Electricity markets have undergone significant changes throughout the last two
decades, beginning first and foremost with the deregulation process. The postderegulation markets experienced significantly different outcomes, most notably
contrastive being the catastrophic meltdown in California and the successful transition of
New York. Continued refinements of the New York markets provide ample material for
reappraisal and analysis of the results of deployed mechanisms and policies. This was
utilized by Hadsell (2007), whose study has provided a means by which to calculate the
“success” of certain market implementations conducted by NYISO through the
determination of their influence, positive or negative, upon price volatility. Using the
methodology of Hadsell (2007) that is discussed in depth in the subsequent section, this
study will model three policies as well as an additional extraneous factor for each
variable’s associated effect on RT price volatility in the NYISO markets.
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CHAPTER 3

Econometric Technique and Analytical Approach
This chapter describes the data and its associated variable specifications as well as
the model to be used during the analysis. The objective is to determine the impact of
specific policies and effects on price volatility. To accomplish this end, a Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model will be used to model
the conditional variance, or volatility, of a constructed return series of real-time prices.
Inclusion of variables for specific policies or events within the variance equation will
facilitate the examination of each variable’s effect on the volatility of electricity prices.
3.1 Data
This research focuses on determining the effect of three specific NYISO policies
and one exogenous factor on price volatility within New York’s electricity markets. The
implemented model described below attempts to capture the effect of each variable,
which includes both implemented market design measures and potential causes of
variability, within the Capital Zone. There is no precise reason for the selection of this
representative zone, and each zone will show different levels of volatility based upon
location. The Long Island and NYC Zones will undoubtedly show relatively higher price
volatility, while those in the western area of the state will show less varying levels
(Figure 2.6). One might presume that the Capital Zone is both physically situated, in
relation to generation location, and well-populated to show a moderate or “average” level
of volatility for the state.
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All data used herein are available from the New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO) as a collection of time series data covering the time span of January 2,
2006 through December 31, 2012. This range is selected because it provides the seven
full years of operational data following the implementation of Standard Market Design
(SMD2) on February 1, 2005.2 During this seven-year time span, 2,534 daily data points
are observed. This figure does not include twenty-three dates and associated data due to
certain characteristics of the data as described in greater detail below. Descriptive
statistics for the data of the following variables are provided in Table 3.1 (Appendix A).
3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Return Series of Price
As discussed in Chapter 2, Locational Based Marginal Prices (LBMPs), as used in
NYISO’s markets, are unique to each zone of the state. They reflect the marginal cost of
adding the next lowest-priced megawatt of energy to the system in $/MWh (NYISO,
“NYISO Glossary,” 2012). For the purpose of this study, an average daily value is
calculated from the Time-Weighted/Integrated Real Time (RT) Zonal LBMP. RT prices
are selected because these spot prices are the basis for driving Market Participant (MP)
behavior. The fact that they are “Time-Weighted/Integrated” simply indicates that
NYISO has calculated an average price over that hour from the five-minute increments of
which it exists. There exist twenty-four hourly intervals for one day, except during DayLight Savings Time (DST) transitions, during which there are either twenty-three or
twenty-five intervals. Similar to the methodology of Hadsell (2007), a return series of
these average daily RT prices was constructed as Rt = ln(Pt /Pt −1) , where Pt is the price
at time t; this is captured by the variable P_RS. Figure 3.1 provides a visual presentation
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See the discussion of SMD2 in Chapter 2: Overview and Review of Existing Literature.
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of the volatility of this return series. The following dates are removed from the set
because the return series calculation is impossible due to the negative value of the daily
average, per the aforementioned formula: 1/1/2006; 7/1/2006; 7/2/2006; 7/23/2008;
7/24/2008; 7/26/2009; 7/27/2009; 8/28/2011; and 8/29/2011.

Figure 3.1: Return Series of NYISO Capital Zone Average Daily RT Prices
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
(Source: NYISO Market & Operational Data)
3.1.2 Exogenous Variables
To capture movement within the mean equation, three exogenous variables are
included. Integrated Real-Time Actual Load, or volume of demand for electricity, is
captured by the LOAD variable. While load in the markets is originally constructed in 5minute increments, similar to the RT prices, NYISO provides this integrated value as the
average load over the entire referenced hour measured in MW. A daily average has been
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calculated from these hourly values, which exist in twenty-four hourly intervals, except
during DST transitions, as described above.
NYISO provides a prediction of hourly load, or a forecasted volume of demand,
on an hourly basis to help ensure the appropriate level of generation is prepared to meet
demand. It is modeled for each zone based upon weather forecasting information and
historic load and weather data (NYISO, “NYISO Load Forecasting,” 2013). These
forecast data have been used to calculate a daily average, measured in MW, and captured
by the variable FRCST. As referenced above, there are dates that lack associated data;
this is not the same as saying the forecast of the day has a value of “0 MW.” Thus the
data of the following dates were removed due to their lack of forecasting data:
10/16/2007; 3/1/2008; 5/21/2008; 1/26/2011; 1/30/2011; 1/31/2011; 11/6/2011;
11/7/2011; 1/26/2012; and 1/27/2011.
Average marginal costs of congestion within the Capital Zone for this period are
captured by the CONG_AVG variable. These data refer to the existence of one or more
constraints within the transmission system and reflect an inability to economically
dispatch electricity at the most efficient level (NYISO, “NYISO Glossary,” 2012). This
occurs due to physical limitations on the network that prohibits least-cost generation from
meeting load requirements; the cost of dispatching the next generator is the marginal cost
of congestion (CARIS 2011, 2012, 73). A daily average has been constructed from the
hourly values provided by NYISO, measured in $/MWh.
3.1.3 Explanatory Variables
To capture the effect of certain events on price volatility, three policy
implementations and one exogenous event factor were tested within the variance equation
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of the model. The first chronological market implementation was mitigation for the Lake
Erie Loop Flow incident (LE08). The term “loop flow” is defined as the difference
between the scheduled bid of energy flow and physical movement of energy (Clamp,
2010). In this case, market participants were scheduling energy bids on a circuitous path
around Lake Erie from New York through the markets of NYISO, Ontario’s Independent
Electricity System Operator (IESO), Midwest Independent Transmission System
Operator (MISO), and PJM Interconnection (Schnell, Docket No. ER08-1281-000, 2008).
In reality, eighty percent of scheduled electricity, flowing in the path of least resistance,
was physically moving directly across the border of NYISO and PJM (FERC, Docket
Nos. ER09-198-000 and ER09-198-001, 2008).
While scheduling bids in this manner was financially profitable for the market
participants due to transmission pricing rules, “these unscheduled flows exacerbate[d]
west-to-east constraints in New York, and thereby increase[d] congestion costs,”
resulting in market fluctuations and uplift charges, or the cost of relieving the congestion
(FERC, Docket Nos. ER09-198-000 and ER09-198-001, 2008; Clamp, 2010). To resolve
this issue, NYISO received permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) for a tariff provision on July 22, 2008, prohibiting this action by market
participants (Schnell, Docket No. ER08-1281-___ (sic), 2008). Inclusion of this market
adjustment as a variable will determine if this was successfully associated with a
reduction in price volatility, which would support the importance and benefit of attentive
analysis and mitigation of market issues. The data for days prior to the execution date
will hold a value of 0 for this variable, while all those after will hold a value of 1.
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Renewable energy is an integral and growing aspect of the future of energy.
NYISO has established wind as “a rapidly growing segment of New York’s power supply
and an essential element of the state’s portfolio of renewable resources” (NYISO, 2011).
Appropriately incorporating these new sources of energy are extremely important as to
ensure a reliable supply of energy across the system. The following two variables
encompass strides forward made by NYISO with regards to wind resources. On June 18,
2008, NYISO received approval from FERC for the mandatory participation of these
resources in providing meteorological data for a centralized wind forecasting system
(NYISO, 2010). This would allow the NYISO to more accurately predict the energy
output by wind resources within the system (FERC, Docket No. ER08-850-000, 2008).
To understand the effect of the implementation of a centralized wind forecasting system,
the variable WIND_FRCST will be modeled such that days prior to the execution date
will hold a value of 0, 1 otherwise.
The second variable to encompass NYISO’s wind resource incorporation efforts
occurred on May 12, 2009 when NYISO received approval from FERC to fully integrate
wind resources into its economic dispatch process (NYISO, 2010). Wind is inherently
intermittent; in addition, these resources can only be established in areas with specific
characteristics favorable for a wind farm (Figure 3.2). This clustering effect combined
with intermittent energy production can cause constraints upon the system (FERC, 2009).
During these times, NYISO proposed wind units be treated as flexible resources by its
grid operators.3 This wind energy management initiative was intended to “improve the
economic efficiency of the real-time market, compared to prior practice” (FERC, 2009).
Therefore, the establishment of this market measure will be incorporated as the variable
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3

Please see FERC (2009) for more information on the establishment of wind units as flexible resources.
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WIND, whereby all data of days prior to May 12, 2009 will hold a value of 0, 1
otherwise.

Figure 3.2: NYISO Existing and Proposed Wind Generation
2009
(Source: Yeomans, 2010)
A number of uncontrollable factors have significant impact on price volatility.
Accurate forecasting of weather-related events can help prepare for the effects of nature
and is therefore an extremely important aspect of electricity market operation. However,
adverse conditions such as thunderstorms will still have some effect on reliability of the
system and, consequently, electricity prices (NYISO, MST Section 2 ‐ Definitions, 2012,
5). Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs) can be issued quite frequently given the weather
patterns of New York State during certain seasons and initiate a region-specific
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conservative system operation through the reduction of transmission transfer limits
(NYISO, “NYISO System Conditions,” 2012). Specifically, “NYISO applies the
requisite transmission constraint sets to redispatch the transmission grid in a fashion that
reliability is effectively supported for the N.Y.C. region” (NYISO, §8.1.7.1: Storm Watch
Costs, 2013, 8.4-8.5). In essence, generation is turned on within the New York City Zone
in anticipation of outages due to lightening strikes; the start-up and minimum generation
costs of these generation units as well as the congestion issues resulting from the
conservative approach to operation impacts electricity prices (NYISO, §4.1.8:
Commitment for Reliability, 2013, 11).4 The effect of a TSA on price volatility will be
captured using the variable TSA; this variable will hold a value of 1 when such an event is
issued, 0 otherwise. To code this variable to these characteristic values, it was first
necessary to convert the End Time Stamp of the limiting constraint data, issued in fiveminute increments, to an associated Begin Time Stamp. Once all date-linked data was
combined, any day with an associated TSA event was coded as 1, those without as 0.
Finally, the following dates and coupled data are removed due to their lack of limiting
constraint data: 11/12008; 9/5/2010; 3/30/2012; and 5/24/2012.
3.2 Analytical Approach
3.2.1 Model Selection
Much like the work of Hadsell (2007), the methodology of this study will use a
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. This tool
uses past values of the dependent and independent variables (Equation 3.3.1) to model
the conditional variance, or volatility, of a variable (Equation 3.3.2), in accordance with
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For more information on costs corresponding to TSAs, please reference NYISO §4.1.8: Commitment for
Reliability (2013) and NYISO §8.1.7.1: Storm Watch Costs (2013)
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Chapter 24: ARCH and GARCH Estimation (2010). Inclusion of variables for specific
policies or events within the variance equation will facilitate the examination of each
variable’s effect on the volatility of electricity prices.
3.2.2 Model Specifications
The modeling for this analytical approach will employ one regression for each of
the four explanatory variables. These will be individually tested within the GARCH
model as variables in the variance equation. In all regressions, the return series of RT
price (P_RS) will run as the dependent variable of the mean specification. All three
exogenous variables, LOAD, FRCST, and CONG_AVG, will be included in the mean
equation as well. Therefore the GARCH specification will assume the following form:
(3.2.2.1)

P _ RS = λ1LOAD + λ2 FRCST + λ3CONG _ AVG + ε

(3.2.2.2)

σ12 = ω + αε t2−1 + βσt2−1 + γEV
€

Within the variance equation, the variable EV refers to the specific explanatory
€
variable for each test; thus the model will be run once for each of the aforementioned
policies and events. Characteristic of a dummy variable, the existence of the explanatory
policy or event gives the variable a value of 1, 0 otherwise. The ω variable is a constant
term, representative of the mean. The ARCH ( ε t2−1) and GARCH ( σt2−1 ) terms refer to
news of the previous period’s volatility and the previous period’s forecasted variance,

€
€ of the variance
respectively. Of importance to this paper
are the coefficients
specification. The coefficient of the explanatory variable, γ, indicates the effect of this
factor on volatility. Per Hadsell (2007), a negative value signifies the variable is
associated with a reduction in volatility; a positive value indicates the opposite.
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Additionally, the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH terms, α and β, respectively, are
used in the calculation of the point estimate of persistence. The calculation (α+β) is
equal to the “time taken for volatility to move half-way back to its unconditional mean
following a given deviation,” whereby shocks are transitory in nature if the value holds at
less than 1 (Hadsell, 2007, 71). Conversion of this basic calculation through the
following formula provides this measurement in days:
(3.2.2.3)

Half Life = ln(1/2)/ln(α+β)

Through this methodology, it is expected that the three implemented policy
variables, LE08, WIND_FRCST, and WIND, will show an associated reduction in price
volatility after their effective date by means of a negative coefficient value. Conversely,
TSA is predicted to possess a positive coefficient, reflecting the associated increase in
price volatility when such an event is issued.
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CHAPTER 4

Analysis of Empirical Results
This chapter presents the econometric findings regarding the determinates of price
volatility in New York’s electricity markets. As described in Chapter 3, the analysis used
a GARCH model of the return series of Real Time NYISO Locational Based Marginal
Prices (LBMPs) as a function of past values of the dependent and exogenous variables.
As expected, the results indicate associated reductions in price volatility related to the
implementation of the Lake Erie Loop Flow mitigation measures; the establishment of a
centralized wind forecasting system; and the inclusion of wind resources in NYISO’s
economic dispatch. The model confirmed Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) events were
associated with an increase in price volatility. Additionally, TSAs exhibited more than
four times the effect on price volatility than the average effect of the other three
implementations, as measured by the absolute value of each variable’s coefficient.
4.1 Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation
The mean equation for this model ran the return series of the average daily price
(P_RS), constructed in Chapter 3, as a function of past values of the dependent variable
and the exogenous variables: average daily load (LOAD), or volume of demand; the
average daily forecast (FRCST), or predicted load; and the average daily congestion
(CONG_AVG), with an error term, ε . The conditional variance equation contained the
ARCH variable, ε t2−1, GARCH variable, σt2−1 , and dummy variable for the Lake Erie Loop
€
Flow, LE08, whose value changed from 0 to 1 on June 22, 2008, marking the

€

€
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implementation of mitigation measures that prohibited circulation of energy around Lake
Erie.
(4.1.1)

P _ RS = λ1LOAD + λ2 FRCST + λ3CONG _ AVG + ε

(4.1.2)

σ12 = ω + αε t2−1 + βσt2−1 + γLE08
€

As is evident from Table 4.1 (Appendix B), all variable coefficients are
€
statistically significant at better than a 1% level. The negative coefficient on the dummy
variable LE08, indicates, as predicted, that the implementation of this market measure
intended to relieve congestion and the associated price increases correlates to a decline in
price volatility. This is visually confirmed in Figure 4.1, where there is a roughly visible
decrease in conditional variance around this period. From the coefficients on the ARCH
( α ) and GARCH ( β) terms of the variance formula, it is possible to determine the point
estimate of persistence; constructed as described in Chapter 3, it would take
€

€
approximately
5.15 days for volatility to revert half-way back to its unconditional mean.
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Figure 4.1: Conditional VarianceConditional
of NYISO variance
Capital Zone RT Price Volatility
Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation (LE08)
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
4.2 Wind Forecasting
To understand the effect of the implementation of a centralized wind forecasting
system, the conditional variance equation of this model was altered accordingly. The
mean equation remained a model of the return series of the average daily price (P_RS) as
a function of the exogenous variables average daily load (LOAD), average daily forecast
(FRCST), and average daily congestion (CONG_AVG), with the error term, ε . The
conditional variance equation remained constant in its inclusion of the ARCH ( ε t2−1) and
€
GARCH ( σt2−1 ) variables, but varied in the included dummy variable; the establishment of

€
wind forecasting was modeled by the variable, WIND_FRCST, whose value and thus
€
existence
of legislation changed from 0 to 1 on June 18, 2008.
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(4.2.1)

P _ RS = λ1LOAD + λ2 FRCST + λ3CONG _ AVG + ε

(4.2.2)

σ12 = ω + αε t2−1 + βσt2−1 + γWIND _ FRCST
€

All coefficients are statistically significant to the 1% level in this model (Table
€
4.2, Appendix B). Focusing on the coefficient, γ , of the dummy variable WIND_FRCST,
its negative value indicates that the introduction of this forecasting system for wind
€
resources in New York’s electricity markets
is associated with a decline in price

volatility. Rough visual confirmation is provided in Figure 4.2, where there is a decline
in conditional variance values around this deployment period. Calculated from the
ARCH ( α ) and GARCH ( β) coefficients of the variance formula, the point estimate of
persistence identifies a measure of approximately 5.16 days following a given deviation
€

€ has moved half-way back to its mean.
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Figure 4.2: Conditional Variance of NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility
Wind Forecasting (WIND_FRCST)
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
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4.3 Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources
Associated effect of the full incorporation of wind resources into the system’s
economic dispatch was analyzed with the same modeling process. The return series of
the average daily price (P_RS) was modeled as a function of the independent variables
average daily load (LOAD), average daily forecast (FRCST), average daily congestion
(CONG_AVG), and the error term, ε . The dummy variable WIND was introduced to the
conditional variance equation to represent the implementation of this wind energy
€
management initiative, the value of which changed from 0 to 1 on May 12, 2009. The

remaining ARCH ( ε t2−1) and GARCH ( σt2−1 ) variables remained constant.
(4.3.1)

€

P _ RS = λ1LOAD + λ2 FRCST + λ3CONG _ AVG + ε
€

σ12 = ω + αε t2−1 + βσt2−1 + γWIND

(4.3.2)

€
This model revealed that all coefficients, excluding that of the dummy variable,
€
WIND, hold statistically significant at a 1% level (Table 4.3, Appendix B). The
coefficient of the dummy variable WIND was negative and significant at a 10% level,
holding all else constant. This signifies that the inclusion of wind resources in economic
dispatch is correlated to a decrease in price volatility, which is visually confirmed in
Figure 4.3. Construction from the ARCH ( α ) and GARCH ( β) coefficients of the
number of days for volatility to move half-way back to its mean after a divergence
€
formula estimates a point estimate of persistence of €
4.90 days.
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Figure 4.3: Conditional VarianceConditional
of NYISO variance
Capital Zone RT Price Volatility
Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources (WIND)
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
4.4 Thunderstorm Alerts
The model for the effect on price volatility of Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs)
utilized the identical mean equation, whereby the return series of the average daily price
(P_RS) was a function of the exogenous variables average daily load (LOAD), the
average daily forecast (FRCST), and the average daily congestion (CONG_AVG), with an
included error term, ε . The conditional variance equation contained the ARCH variable
( ε t2−1), GARCH variable ( σt2−1 ), and a dummy variable for days of Thunderstorm Alerts,
€
TSA, which held a value of 1 on dates with recorded TSA events and 0 on those without.

€

€
(4.4.1)

P _ RS = λ1LOAD + λ2 FRCST + λ3CONG _ AVG + ε

(4.4.2)

σ12 = ω + αε t2−1 + βσt2−1 + γTSA
€
€
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As is evident from Table 4.4 (Appendix B), all coefficients are statistically
significant at a 1% level. The dummy variable TSA, of which this paper is concerned, has
an associated positive coefficient. This indicates, as expected, the issuance of a TSA
event is correlated to an increase in price volatility. This is visually confirmed in Figure
4.4, where the frequency of TSA events is illustrated by the much more volatile
conditional variance when compared to Figures 4.1 through 4.3. The point estimate of
persistence, as constructed From the ARCH ( α ) and GARCH ( β) coefficients of the
variance formula, estimates that the time span during which volatility would revert half
€
€
way back to its unconditional mean would be approximately
0.79 days.
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Figure 4.4: Conditional VarianceConditional
of NYISO variance
Capital Zone RT Price Volatility
Thunderstorm Alerts (TSA)
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Findings
The analytical models used herein found the three indentified market deployments
executed by NYISO have been associated with a successful reduction in price volatility.
This characteristic holds true following the prohibition of circuitous bid scheduling
around Lake Erie, mitigation put in place to resolve the Lake Erie Loop Flow issue and
the resultant congestion that produced market fluctuations and uplift charges. In addition,
there was an associated reduction in price volatility with the establishment of a
centralized wind forecasting system that provided NYISO with a more accurate
prediction of energy output produced by wind resources. Finally, this association was
characteristic of the incorporation of wind resources in NYISO’s economic dispatch in
order to help resolve the issue of system constraints resultant of concentrated but
intermittent energy generation.
This study also explored the impact of the anticipatory announcement of
Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs) on price volatility. Preparation after the issuance of a TSA
requires generation start-up in New York City; typically, start-up costs in conjunction
with line congestion due to operational measures highly impact electricity prices. When
analyzed as an explanatory variable within the GARCH model, there was an associated
increase in price volatility. The effect of a TSA event on volatility compared to the
implementation of the three volatility-reduction policies was over four times greater in
magnitude.
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5.2 Policy Implications
As the United States and New York State move farther into the era of deregulated
electricity markets, the twin goals of efficiency and reliability remain important and
worthy of research. Numerous studies have been conducted on price volatility in markets
around the world; these have included, but have certainly not been limited to, modeling
the markets of England and Wales (Tashpulatov, 2011); Spain, California, UK, and PJM
(Benini, et al., 2002); and Australia (Thomas and Mitchell, 2007). However, very few
studies had been conducted on the New York markets thus far, the primary source for this
document being the analysis of Hadsell (2007) on virtual bidding. This study revealed
the successful reduction in price volatility associated with a number of specific policies
within the Capital Zone. Frequently, new market mechanisms are enacted with the belief
that they will improve the market, but the results are rarely assessed adequately. Studies
like these support continued research into the post-effects of market design measure
implementations, where both positive outcomes as well as potential negative market
responses may occur; post-execution studies ensure fine-tuning and perhaps even policyreversal efforts are implemented in timely manner.
Explanatory variables included in this particular study lend support for continued
analysis of the current market design. The Lake Erie Loop Flow response provides
support to the importance of market monitoring and mitigation efforts. Market
participants, though acquitted of any charges of market manipulation or tariff violation by
FERC, were certainly taking advantage of pricing knowledge for profit purposes (Clamp,
2010). While this particular loop flow was corrected through NYISO’s circuitous
prohibition measures, the organization also implemented “rigorous monitoring
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procedures to provide transparency and to better address congestion costs,” which
included “a daily review of market outcomes to identify unusual or unexpected market
outcomes to identify the root-cause source of certain uplift and other marketplace costs”
(Clamp, 2010). Undeniably, constant and meticulous monitoring of the markets is
required to maintain a state of equilibrium. Studies like this one address the benefits of
market monitoring to general market welfare; while it was determined that uplift charges
were reduced, this policy was associated with an additional overall reduction in price
volatility.
Accurate forecasting is an extremely important aspect of market operations, and
this study supports advancements both in terms of weather and load. First and foremost
is the consideration of uncontrollable but oftentimes-predictable natural occurrences. If
the market is prepared for these events through accurate forecasting efforts, the impacts
may be somewhat alleviated. TSAs allow the market to ramp up generation in
preparation of potential line outages; implementation of these events undoubtedly helps
reduce drastic price fluctuations that would occur if reliability of the system was
threatened. While it is important to understand that the announcement of a TSA will
cause temporary volatility in the markets, accurate forecasting allows market participants
to prepare for both requests for additional generation as well as expected price
fluctuations consequential of a TSA.
Forecasting weather comes into effect with regards to wind resources as well.
This study found that providing detailed information to NYISO for maintenance of a
centralized wind forecasting system facilitated improved forecasting of energy
production by wind resources. Further enhancements were made with the full

46

	
  
incorporation of wind resources into the economic dispatching system. Both of these
measures taken to improve the reliability of this renewable energy source on the
transmission system helped alleviate price volatility in the markets.
Green energy appears destined to play a growing role in the future of electricity
markets. However, the nature of this power production is quite unique, such that
generation is often intermittent and clustered in areas favorable to the source of energy.
Careful and continuous analysis should be taken before and after the assimilation of
renewable energy resources to ensure optimized integration into the electricity markets
and continued transmission system reliability.
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research
The modeling of this paper was successful in documenting the impact of these
variables on price volatility. Nevertheless, there are certainly areas for further research as
well as some shortcomings of the current research that should be discussed.
First and foremost, expansion of data to include all zones of the New York
Control Area would be advantageous in understanding both the impact of the analyzed
factors within each additional zone as well as the their more general, market-wide effect.
This study focused on market information exclusively related to NYISO’s Capital Zone.
This is only one of eleven zones in the New York transmission system, and as such,
provides only one view of the data. Logically, it seems unlikely that there would be a
price volatility effect reversal of any of the four analyzed variables; this is supported by
the results of Hadsell (2007), who determined that virtual bidding was associated with a
statistically significant reduction in RT price volatility in all zones, excluding the Long
Island Zone. However, while the four explanatory variables analyzed herein may not
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reverse their impact on price volatility, the magnitude of the effect of each may vary in
different regions of the state.
In terms of the variables analyzed herein, it may happen that the Lake Erie Loop
Flow variable has more impact on zones in the western region of the state bordering this
lake where congestion may have concentrated; therefore, while the variables certainly
show effect on volatility in the Capital Zone, the associated coefficient in the West could
be notably higher. In continuation of location-based analysis, the concentrated presence
of wind generation in the northern and western regions of the state (Figure 3.2) may
cause interesting effects on the magnitude of the WIND and WIND_FRCST variable
coefficients specific to these zones as well (Yeomans, 2010). Typically, these areas will
have characteristically lower prices with the existence of congestion in the system,
inhibiting the easy movement of this generation to demand-intensive locations (Hausman
et al., 2006, 4). Volatility may already be reduced due to the excessive supply of
generation and therefore these variables may have less effect. Conversely, forecasting
and economic dispatch of these resources could enable smoother transfers of energy
across constraints; these variables could, in turn, have the same or greater effect as they
held in the Capital Zone. In both instances, limiting the scope of the study to the Capital
Zone has inhibited an understanding of the broader market spectrum. Expansion of zonal
data for this study will confirm each variable has the same associated effect across the
state and will be more useful for a market-wide analysis of the events.
This data expansion would have the additional benefit of resolving the issue
regarding the removal of twenty-three dates and associated data due to their lack of
usable data. Any time data must be removed, there is an assumed effect of some
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magnitude on the results of the analysis. Fortunately, this data set is expansive, with
seven years of hourly data converted to daily averages, producing 2,557 unique data
points; the elimination of twenty-three points removes only 0.9% of the original data.
Therefore, the effect from the removal of these dates is presumed to be minimal.
While cross-sectional data expansion is indeed important, it would be beneficial
to expand the time span of the study as well. The implementation of Standard Market
Design (SMD2) on February 1, 2005 was arguably the most crucial development in the
New York markets to date (NYISO, 2005, 1). Analyzing the associated impact of this
market change on price volatility would be exceedingly valuable and would require an
expanded time span of data. However, keep in mind that it may be crucial to impose time
span constraints when analyzing individual market adjustments and policies, based on
their unique implementation dates. The drastic market changes that occurred as a result
of SMD2 severely altered the data prior to and after this date; using a dataset spanning
this marker may reflect less the impact of the explanatory variable and more the
overwhelming effect of SMD2. Dependent upon the relative deployment date of the
analyzed policy, limiting data to before or after the SMD2 implementation date may
become crucial.
Further investigation of additional market implementations as well as adverse
conditions like TSAs and their effects on price volatility in NYISO markets would be
useful to understand what impacts the system and where further investigation and efforts
should be focused. Relating directly to this study, there was an adjustment made to the
centralized wind forecasting system in 2010. From that point forward, wind resource
participants were obligated to provide meteorological data for a five-kilometer radius
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around each turbine at a constant thirty-second stream of data for NYISO’s forecasting
efforts (Yeomans, 2010). Whether this adjustment was beneficial in terms of price
volatility would be a useful focus of analysis. Not only would it show the benefit of wind
forecasting, it would also indicate the value of continued analysis and fine-tuning of
already-executed market implementations. Furthermore, additional analysis conducted
on renewable energy sources is extremely valuable as the electricity industry moves
steadily forward in its efforts to research and incorporate additional sources of green
technology.
While analyzing the impact of the implementation of certain market mechanisms
has its benefits in determining the successes and failures of these policies, approaching
the issue of price volatility from a different angle may provide even greater insight into
this issue. This study began by researching policies and modeling their impact on price
volatility; an alternative approach would be to identify periods of less volatility and
attempt to uncover the trigger that sparked this reduction. This may be an appropriate
way to uncover the mechanisms that caused the periods of relative calm that can be seen
in the graph of the return series of prices in Figure 3.1. Noteworthy of this figure as well
are the distinct periods of high volatility. This methodological approach could also be
used to research the causes of these extreme price fluctuation episodes.
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APPENDIX A

Data
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

Observations5

0.0008

0.3174

4.3782

-2.8266

2534

1311.956
1271.602
-12.0989

159.2651
152.1447
24.0556

159.2651
152.1447
24.0556

921.1958
917.1667
-260.93

2534
2534
2534

0.6342
0.6476
0.5193
0.0837

0.4818
0.4778
0.4997
0.2769

1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0

2534
2534
2534
2534

Dependent Variable
P_RS
Exogenous Variables
LOAD
FRCST
CONG_AVG
Explanatory Variables
LE08
WIND_FRCST
WIND
TSA

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11;
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12. For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique
and Analytical Approach.
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APPENDIX B

Regression Estimations
Table 4.1: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
Variable/Coefficient

Coefficient Value

Standard Error

Significance (p-stat)

λ1
λ2
λ3

0.0009
-0.0008
-0.0014

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001

** 0.0000
** 0.0000
** 0.0000

ω
γ

0.0154
-0.0034

0.0009
0.0010

** 0.0000
** 0.0006

α

0.2610

0.0156

** 0.0000

β

0.6130

0.0121

** 0.0000

Calculated Term

Calculated Value

(α+β)
Half-Life

0.8740
5.1475

Mean Equation
LOAD
FRCST
CONG_AVG
Variance Equation
Constant
LE08
ARCH (
GARCH (

)
)

Effective Date of LE08: July 22, 2008
Number of Observations: 2,5346
** Statistically significant at 1%
* Statistically significant at 10%

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6

This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11;
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12. For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique
and Analytical Approach.
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Table 4.2: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Wind Forecasting
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
Variable/Coefficient

Coefficient Value

Standard Error

Significance (p-stat)

λ1
λ2
λ3

0.0013
-0.0013
-0.0009

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001

** 0.0000
** 0.0000
** 0.0000

Constant
WIND_FRCST

ω
γ

0.0155
-0.0035

0.0009
0.0010

** 0.0000
** 0.0004

ARCH (

α

0.2608

0.0156

** 0.0000

β

0.6136

0.0121

** 0.0000

Calculated Term

Calculated Value

(α+β)
Half-Life

0.8744
5.1644

Mean Equation
LOAD
FRCST
CONG_AVG
Variance Equation

GARCH (

)
)

Effective Date of WIND_FRCST: June 18, 2008
Number of Observations: 2,5347
** Statistically significant at 1%
* Statistically significant at 10%

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7

This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11;
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12. For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique
and Analytical Approach.
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Table 4.3: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
Variable/Coefficient

Coefficient Value

Standard Error

Significance (p-stat)

λ1
λ2
λ3

0.0014
-0.0013
-0.0008

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001

** 0.0000
** 0.0000
** 0.0000

ω
γ

0.0146
-0.0034

0.0008
0.0010

** 0.0000
* 0.0827

α

0.2644

0.0156

** 0.0000

β

0.6038

0.0122

** 0.0000

Calculated Term

Calculated Value

(α+β)
Half-Life

0.8682
4.9049

Mean Equation
LOAD
FRCST
CONG_AVG
Variance Equation
Constant
WIND
ARCH (
GARCH (

)
)

Effective Date of WIND: May 12, 2009
Number of Observations: 2,5348
** Statistically significant at 1%
* Statistically significant at 10%

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8

This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11;
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12. For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique
and Analytical Approach.

58

	
  
Table 4.4: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Thunderstorm Alerts
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012
Variable/Coefficient

Coefficient Value

Standard Error

Significance (p-stat)

λ1
λ2
λ3

0.0009
-0.0008
-0.0014

0.0001
0.0001
0.0002

** 0.0000
** 0.0000
** 0.0000

ω
γ

0.03734
0.1562

0.0021
0.0087

** 0.0000
** 0.0000

α

0.2985

0.0223

** 0.0000

β

0.1170

0.0274

** 0.0000

Calculated Term

Calculated Value

(α+β)
Half-Life

0.4154
0.7891

Mean Equation
LOAD
FRCST
CONG_AVG
Variance Equation
Constant
TSA
ARCH (
GARCH (

)
)

Number of Observations: 2,5349
** Statistically significant at 1%
* Statistically significant at 10%

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9

This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11;
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12. For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique
and Analytical Approach.
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